Introduction
While Buddhist discourse seemingly does not foster a problem concerning the existence of evil, it is imperative to show how early Buddhist tradition ontologically contradicts with its premises in its attempt to evaluate the existence of suffering to accurately examine the approach taken by this discourse. Accordingly, in this paper I will pursue to demonstrate how early Buddhist philosophy fails to maintain consistent ontological and metaphysical frameworks as it perceives beings in terms of finitude (Umehara, 1970) yet does not evidently acknowledge the continuity of spatial, temporal, and casual nature of things, which are required for us to claim that a thing is empirically real (Abelsen, 1993) .
Thus, I will first dissect the Buddhist approach to existence of beings and to the four noble truths and show how these two approaches might engender a logical problem through Schopenhauer's fourfold law of sufficient reason.
Then, I will wear a Western perspective to argue that while Buddhist view on existence seems rational, its approach to evil and suffering has essential epistemological complications.
In the conclusion, I will suggest that the implementation of Heidegger's account of suffering, which ultimately originates from a similar metaphysical and epistemological understanding of world to that of Buddhist tradition, to the Buddhist discourse of existence provides the discourse with further consistency which Buddhist account of suffering fails to capture. The four noble truths are as follows:
(1) Suffering exists
(2) Suffering has a cause
(3) The cause can be removed (4) There are eight practices by which the cause of suffering can be removed (Umehara, 1970) Now, prima facie, Buddhism acknowledges that suffering exists.
Furthermore, it also acknowledges that its existence follows a cause, as
(2) states. Indeed, (2) is contingent to Buddhist perception of this world that every phenomena is conditioned by causes (Kalupahana, 1977) . This account creates an empirical basis for a metaphysical explanation of this world which ultimately stems from impermanency and which accordingly rejects substantial forms.
However, this does not eo ipso mean that since all phenomena are impermanent all phenomena therefore are or imply dukkha -suffering, unrest-. While all phenomena are nonsubstantial since they are casually determined, not all phenomena are dispositionally determined, and only those that are dispositionally determined are dukkha (Kalupahana, 1977) . Thus, although world is necessarily impermanent, the suffering can be avoided as not everything is dispositionally determined (Gäb, 2015) .
Problem with the Solution for Suffering in Early Buddhism
The discourse of phenomena and how they are determined, I believe,
can be analyzed in the context of Schopenhauer's fourfold law of sufficient reason (Schopenhauer, 2012) . Indeed, I would like to argue that we start to recognize similar traces of metaphysics, ontology, and epistemology in Schopenhauer's principle as we begin to further analyze how the existence persists in spatiotemporal universe in Buddhism.
In early Buddhist tradition, the world is devoid of substance, exists only in terms of emptiness as all phenomena is essentially finite and ephemeral (Abelsen, 1993) . While the accession of (3) presupposes a conscious will, finitude extends beyond humans to all beings (Stambaugh, 1970) . This argument presumes a kind of causality that fourfold law of sufficient reason asserts. It necessitates beings, consciousness, and actions in spatiotemporal dimension to ensue on a preceding being, consciousness, or an action that existed in the same spatiotemporal dimension. Accordingly, while Buddhism seems to reject ontology of beings as defined in Western tradition, it ultimately permits ontological assay of beings. Furthermore, the propositions of four noble truths do not demonstrate the intrinsic quality of truths themselves, but the sacredness they engender displays the quality Buddha has given to them (Orrù & Wang, 1992) . That is, while four noble truths imply the value they are bestowed, they lack the capacity to capture the essence of the essence of themselves.
To these ends, Buddhism's four noble truths self contradict in that while the Buddhist argument originates from the claim that a being or a thought necessarily precedes a being or a thought as all beings are impermanent themselves, it also argues for the possibility of cessation of the cause of suffering. This worldview is then conflicting since while the views of impermanency and (3) are valid per se, they are inconsistent with each other. That is, if the ephemerality of beings prove the causality that the principle of sufficient reason argues for holds true, then the cause of suffering cannot be removed for two reasons. (Gäb, 2015) , a will that is dispositional towards this craving would also result in suffering as it essentially is craving itself. Thus, if (3) is realized by a dispositional notion, which is fundamentally very likely, then (3) paradoxically engenders (1).
Using Heidegger's Angst to Solve the Problem
Since the metaphysical and epistemological prescription of the world of Buddhist tradition is very similar to that of Heidegger, I would like to propose changing Buddhist account of dukkha to Heidegger's account of Angst (Heidegger, 1962) as I believe the concept of Angst provides more consistency to Buddhist discourse than dukkha does. However, I want to respond to some possible counterarguments to my proposition before discussing why it appears as a rational idea to implement Angst into Buddhist philosophy how it could be accomplished.
( (2) Another point of view that attempts to undermine my proposition is that the concern of finitude extend beyond humans in Buddhism (Stambaugh, 1970 ) while Heidegger's ontology mainly discusses being and be-ing as a human. Stambaugh argues that Heidegger's Angst "is a fundamental state of mind of Dasein" and has a revealing character in that it "reveals to Dasein the world as world in all its uncanniness." (Stambaugh, 1970 Then, Angst does not directly reveal the world and its uncanniness to
Dasein, but when Das Man becomes Dasein, he/she becomes aware of the world Angst implies. Ergo, while Heidegger's concern for finitude does not extend beyond humans like Buddhist concern, the finitude per se does. The reason it is not discussed in Heidegger's ontology as clearly as in Buddhist discourse is that the Geworfenheit can only be a constant medium for Dasein, which, ultimately, is human.
(3) Last counterargument is that the deconstruction I apply to Buddhist philosophy and Heidegger's ontology is simply too much that recombining certain parts of each scheme would mean that the system I create would not be employed by Buddhist tradition. That is, if I subtract dukkha and melt Angst in Buddhism, it would neither be Buddhism nor Heidegger's ontology. This argument resembles (1) but is different from (1) in that it threatens the entire integrity of Buddhist tradition while (1) mainly concerns four noble truths. I would like to disagree with this supposition.
The reason I believe that deconstruction of both philosophies does not eo ipso jeopardize the integrity of these philosophies is that they both can only function in the spatiotemporal domain. Therefore, Heidegger's ontology, which insists that be-ing is not situated in time per se, but that
Zeitigung "(temporalization) of time, [...] is precisely" the "understanding of being", (Levinas & Committee of Public, 1996) and early Buddhist discourse which constructs its ontological philosophy on the finitude of beings share a common rhizome. For this reason, I believe that In order to implement Angst into Buddhist discourse, we ought not to limit the question of suffering to Angst. While suffering exists in other forms, Angst ought to be discussed only as a transcendental consequence of Zeitgung. Heidegger claimed that every understanding originates from an affective disposition, and that our being is essentially understanding of being, our way of self-Zeitgung (Levinas & Committee of Public, 1996) .
Since understanding of self is manifested through disposition, then being also is manifested through disposition. With hypothetical syllogism, since understanding of self through Zeitgung is being, and since it is determined dispositionally, understanding of self is a cause of suffering. 
